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I. THE PROBLEM
From 1968 to 2010, Medicare expenditures steadily climbed from
0.7% of Gross Domestic Product to 3.6%.I The percentage declined
in only three of those forty-two years. 2 Medicare's Board of Trustees
estimates that the percentage will continue to grow into the
foreseeable future. 3 This article explains how a powerful cognitive
bias, the endowment effect, prevents the government from reducing
expenditures even when the money could be put to better use
elsewhere. This article then uses experimental findings about the
endowment effect to craft solutions to the problem.
A. The Endowment Effect
The endowment effect is the phenomenon whereby people value
something more when they own it than when they do not own it.4
Numerous psychological experiments have observed a large
differential between willingness to pay for an entitlement ("WTP")
and willingness to accept compensation for that entitlement once
owned ("WTA").5 For example, in an experiment in which half of the
subjects were given mugs and half were not, the median WTA was
$5.25 but the median WTP was only $2.50.6 This differential occurs
1. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE CHARTBOOK fig. 8.4 (4th ed.
2010), available at http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?cb=5 8&sctn= 1 69&ch= 1796.
2. Id.
3. THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 2012 Annual Report of the
Boards of Trustees 21, available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/
tr2012.pdf.
4. James Robert Ward III, The Endowment Effect and the Empirical Case for
Changing the Default Employment Contract from Termination "At-Will" to "For-
Cause" Discharge, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 205, 209 (2004) (defining the
endowment effect as "the principle that people tend to value goods more when they
own them than when they do not").
5. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97
Nw. U.L. REv. 1227, 1228 (2003) (describing "the empirically observed
phenomenon that people will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they
possess than they would pay for the same good if they did not possess it at
present.").
6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
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even when intangible entitlements are at issue.7  What turns the
differential from an interesting anomaly into an economic obstruction
is the way that it impedes efficient transactions. Economists would
predict that 50% of the mugs in the above experiment would be sold
because the laws of probability indicate that 50% of the people who
randomly received mugs initially valued them less than the average
subject.8 However, in practice only 10.2% of mugs were sold.9 Five
times as many people would have received something that they value
more if researchers had employed a method for circumventing the
endowment effect.
Many legal scholars now take the existence of the endowment
effect into account when predicting behavior. 10 This is a good first
step, but we need to move beyond merely acknowledging the
existence of the endowment effect to exploring the ways that it varies
depending on context." This Article will describe seven nuanced
findings of behavioral experiments and then employ those findings to
support a variety of proposals for mitigating the endowment effect's
impact on Medicare.
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 196
(1991).
7. John Horowitz & Kenneth McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 429 (2002) (reporting a WTA/WTP ratio of 4.24 for
the right to postal delivery).
8. Kahneman et al., supra note 6, at 196.
9. Id. (stating that of the 88 distributed mugs, only 9 were traded).
10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, & Richard Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325, 1339-41 (1990) (arguing that the Coase theorem is flawed because the
endowment effect will inhibit transactions). The Coase theorem states that if
transaction costs are zero, then parties will negotiate to reach an efficient
distribution of rights regardless of the initial distribution. Coase himself pointed out
that it is unrealistic to assume zero transaction costs, but he did not address the
theorem's failure to take into account the endowment effect. See Victoria Nourse &
Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of a New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 67 n. 12 (2009).
11. See Ward, supra note 4, at 210 (warning that application of the endowment
effect requires nuance and that legal scholars often fail to understand that the
endowment effect is context dependent).
1712013]
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B. The Problem that the Endowment Effect Causes for Medicare
The endowment effect has a strong impact on health care
entitlements.12  A review of studies that compared WTA to WTP
found that subjects required 10.06 times more to give up a healthcare
entitlement than they were willing to pay for it.13  To put the
magnitude of this effect into context, consider that this suggests
beneficiaries would rather hold on to their Medicare benefits than
accept $120,000 per year, per Medicare beneficiary, even though they
would have only paid $12,000 for those same benefits before they
obtained them.14 The strength of the endowment effect's attachment
to healthcare should concern policymakers because of the massive
amounts spent on Medicare. Medicare spending was $565.3 billion in
2011, and the Congressional Budget Office estimates that spending
will continue to grow at an average of 6.3% per year.' 5
Much of the policy opposition to Medicare focuses on the fact that
benefits are a one-way ratchet due to insurmountable political
opposition to taking away a benefit once bestowed.16 This one-way
ratchet, which is anathema to budgetary constraints and
experimentation, is imposed by the endowment effect.' 7  Political
12. Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225, 239 (1991) (attributing the heavy involvement of charitable institutions
in health care to the large differential between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept). Posner posited, for example, that the endowment effect explains why the
value of maternity benefits increases after state laws confer the right to maternity
benefits. Robert Scharff & Francisco Partisi, Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian
Learning in the Creation ofNew Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 25, 29 (2006).
13. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 7, at 433.
14. NAT'L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE, FACTS
ABOUT MEDICARE, http://www.ncpssm.org/medicare/fastfactm/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2013) (stating that there were 47.5 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2010).
15. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MARCH 2012 MEDICARE BASELINE 1
(2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
43060_Medicare.pdf.
16. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1165, 1175 (2003) ("The politics of Medicare created a one-way
ratchet.").
17. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813, 827-28 (1998) (arguing that the endowment effect will cause those
benefitting from legislation to invest more in keeping that benefit than those with an
equally strong reason to remove the benefit).
172 [Vol. 49
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opposition to rescinding Medicare benefits can become fiercely
emotional, as seen when an elderly man jumped atop the hood of a
congressman's fleeing car to protest the way that the Catastrophic
Coverage Act threatened his Medicare benefits.' 8
The endowment effect causes three crucial problems for
Medicare. First, it prevents the government from allocating money to
where it would create the most value.19 For example, even if citizens
later decide that each dollar spent on education is twice as beneficial
as a dollar spent on Medicare, they would nevertheless oppose taking
away dollars from existing Medicare benefits to spend on education if
they experienced an endowment effect of the magnitude experienced
in the mug experiments mentioned above. 20 The second problem is
that the endowment effect inhibits experimentation. Medicare has had
some success with adding new programs, such as Part C, 2 1 which
allows for the use of private insurers to provide coverage traditionally
supplied by the government. 2 2 However, innovations are few and far
between because the government cannot experiment without running
the risk that the endowment effect will grow too strong before a new
program reveals its failings, forever entrenching a suboptimal
program. The third problem is that the endowment effect prevents the
government from staying within a budget. Medicare expenditures are
tied to factors that change unpredictably and the endowment effect
reduces the ability to adapt to changes. Medicare is an "entitlement"
program, meaning that it guarantees certain treatments or a percentage
of the cost of certain treatments rather than guaranteeing a set amount
of money. 2 3 This makes budget control difficult because the costs of
18. Hyman, supra note 16, at 1177.
19. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 230 (using economic theory to show
that when endowment effects exist, social wealth might not reach its full potential
even though the market has reached a Pareto-optimal outcome).
20. Kahneman et al., supra note 6, at 196 (reporting a WTP only 48% as large
as WTA).
21. Robert Moffit, The Success of Medicare Advantage Plans: What Seniors
Should Know, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 13, 2008)
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/the-success-of-medicare-
advantage-plans-what-seniors-should-know (calling Part C a success because it
offers both security and increased freedom of choice).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-25 (1997).
23. See Marilyn Moon, Future of Medicare as an Entitlement Program, 12
ELDER L.J. 225, 226 (2004) (explaining that many policy makers have called
1732013]
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any treatment can rise unpredictably. For example, between 2001 and
2002 the cost to Medicare of computed tomography ("CT") and
magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") scans jumped almost 20%.24
Another unpredictable aspect of Medicare is that expenditures are tied
to demographic changes, such as the baby boom, because age
determines eligibility. 25
This Article argues that by utilizing behavioral studies of the
endowment effect, we can design government programs that can be
reduced or expanded as needed without excessive opposition.
II. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
The perception of an entitlement and the context of a transaction
affect the magnitude of the endowment effect. 26  This section
describes seven experimental findings 2 7 that can reduce the
endowment effect, and the next section uses these findings to craft a
range of solutions to the endowment effect problem plaguing the
current Medicare system.
The first pertinent finding is the endowment effect attaches less
strongly to entitlements that are not protectable with an injunction.
This was demonstrated in experiments comparing liability rules to
property rules. A liability rule is a rule under which entitlement
holders can be forced to give up their entitlement for a specified dollar
Medicare an unsustainable entitlement program because it guarantees benefits to all
who are eligible).
24. Maureen Glabman, Health Plans Strain To Contain Rapidly Rising Cost of
Imaging, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2005, available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0501/0501.imaging.html.
25. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, When & How to Get Medicare,
THE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SITE FOR MEDICARE, http://medicare.gov/sign-up-
change-plans/get-parts-a-and-b/when-and-how-to-get-parts-a-and-b.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2013) (stating that eligibility starts at age sixty five).
26. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1229 ("The existence and extent of the
endowment effect is context-dependent.").
27. While many of the endowment effect experiments that will be described in
this article used students exclusively as subjects, that should not be a concern
because a survey of forty-five studies found that students do not experience a greater
endowment effect than the general public. See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note
7, at 427.
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amount.28 A property rule is a rule under which entitlements can only
be taken with the consent of the owner. 29 For example, the right to
exclude from one's land is protected by a property rule, meaning one
can call the police to evict trespassers. On the other hand, contractual
rights are usually protected by liability rules, meaning one's only
recourse upon breach is to demand monetary compensation. It is not a
coincidence that people fight more fervently for their homes than their
contracts. 30 One experiment asked half of the subjects whether they
would buy plants and ponds, and the other half whether they would
sell the same items at a certain price.31 Subjects exhibited a
significant endowment effect for entitlements protected by a property
rule but not for entitlements protected by a liability rule. 32 The second
pertinent finding is that the endowment effect is enhanced when it is
difficult to determine the exact value of the entitlement.33  In one
experiment, no significant endowment effect attached to tokens that
test subjects could redeem for a fixed amount, while a considerable
endowment effect attached to tokens that subjects could redeem for a
random amount. 34 Another experiment can be interpreted to show that
the endowment effect attaches more strongly to lottery tickets than to
cash.35 In that experiment, each subject was given either a lottery
28. Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 220 (2006).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970)
(analyzing a situation in which homeowners appealed a decision giving them money
damages for the pollution from a cement plant because they would only be satisfied
with an injunction).
31. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1541, 1561-64 (1998).
32. Id. at 1566 (explaining that other scholars have argued that there is no
difference between property and liability rules, but their arguments do not have
empirical evidence).
33. See id. at 29 ("The disparity between WTA and WTP is larger when the
items being traded are difficult to compare.").
34. Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Buying and Selling Exchange
Goods: Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 517, 519-
21 (1996).
35. See Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation
Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of
Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 517-18 (testing ninety part-time students, most of whom
2013] 175
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ticket or two one-dollar bills. A full 86% of subjects would refuse to
give up a lottery ticket for $2 whereas only 70% of subjects would
refuse to give up $2 for a lottery ticket. This gap was not attributable
to a perception that the lottery ticket was worth more than $2 because
a separate group of subjects- designated advisors rather than
participants was approximately evenly divided on whether they would
advise participating subjects to exchange a ticket for $2.
The third pertinent finding is that people are less resistant to
giving up something that is characterized as a bonus rather than a
baseline. One study demonstrated that more people thought it was
unfair to raise the price of a car above list price than to reduce the
discount on a car by the same amount. 36 Similarly, people were more
than twice as accepting of a decrease in wages if it was carried out by
omitting to raise wages along with inflation rather than by directly
decreasing the baseline amount of wages. 37
The fourth pertinent finding is that the endowment effect will
increase with the evolutionary salience of the item in question. The
"evolutionary salience" of an item is the connection an organism
perceives between its survival and that item. Thus, food has more
evolutionary salience than toys. One study found that chimpanzees
exhibited a stronger endowment effect towards food than toys.38 A
survey of endowment effect experiments concluded that "the
perceived necessity of an item to a person's survival contributes to the
exhibition of the endowment effect." 39 This conclusion is also
supported by the fact that experiments on humans found a stronger
had work experience and thus should better represent the population of Medicare
beneficiaries than full-time students).
36. Kahneman et al., supra note 6, at 203-04 (finding that 71% of subjects
thought it was unfair to raise the price of a car by $200 when it had been selling at
the list price whereas only 42% of subjects thought it was unfair to raise the price to
the list price when it had been selling at $200 below the list price).
37. Id. at 204 (finding that 78% of subjects thought it was acceptable to raise
wages by only 5% after 12% inflation but only 37% thought it was acceptable to
reduce wages by 7%).
38. Owen Jones & Sarah Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory
of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1935 (2008) (finding no
endowment effect for trades between rope and bone but finding that even though the
majority of chimpanzees preferred peanut butter to juice, only 21% of those given
juice traded it for peanut butter).
39. Ward, supra note 4, at 213.
176 [Vol. 49
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endowment effect for chocolate and Coke than for movie tickets and
hockey tickets. 40
The fifth pertinent finding is that people experience less of an
endowment effect when they assess an entitlement for its exchange
value rather than its use value. To clarify, the exchange value of a pill
would be the price at which others would buy it, whereas its use value
would be the value of using the medical properties of the pill. This is
why professional sellers do not feel an endowment effect attached to
their goods. Two experiments support this fifth finding.41 The first
experiment found an endowment effect when subjects were given
mugs without explanation but found no endowment effect when
subjects were given mugs and told that these mugs were produced by
the factory of a company whose profits they will receive. 42  The
second experiment found that the endowment effect dwindled to
statistical insignificance when subjects were encouraged to think like
a merchant by involving them in repeated transactions on both the buy
and sell side.43 This finding is probably responsible for the conclusion
that the endowment effect is greater for public and non-market
goods,4 since those goods are less often considered for their exchange
value.
The sixth pertinent finding is that the endowment effect increases
over time. One experiment confirmed this by giving one-fourth of
subjects a mug twenty-five minutes before selling time, one-fourth of
subjects a mug five minutes before selling time, and one-half of
subjects no mug at selling time.45 Subjects who never received a mug
were only willing to pay on average $2.75; subjects who had the mug
for five minutes demanded $4.32; and subjects who had the mug for
twenty-five minutes demanded $5.26.46 The solution section of this
40. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 7, at 429.
41. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1239.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1239-40.
44. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 7, at 427.
45. Michal A. Strahilevitz & George Loewenstein, The Effects of Ownership
History on the Valuation of Objects, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 276, 278 (1998)
(performing this experiment on a class of seventy-four M.B.A. students and a class
of sixty-four executive M.B.A. students).
46. Id. at 279.
2013] 177
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Article will discuss the consonance of this finding with academic
theories about the time when legal entitlements are most vulnerable.
The seventh pertinent finding is that the endowment effect is
increased more by taking possession of something than by learning
that one has a legal right to it. In a novel version of the classic mug
experiment, experimenters told a group of people that they now
owned a mug but only let half of those people physically possess the
mug. Physical possession in this experiment meant the subjects
touched the mug and then set it on the desk in front of them.47 Those
who had physical possession exhibited a significantly stronger
endowment effect than those who merely learned that they were
legally entitled to it.4 8
III. METHODS FOR LESSENING THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT ATTACHED TO
MEDICARE BENEFITS
The experimental findings above suggest that the endowment
effect attached to Medicare benefits can be ameliorated with the
following solutions, which will be discussed in order from least to
most logistically difficult to implement: (1) quickly cut programs that
do not meet expectations; (2) persistently call Medicare programs
"pilot programs" and stress that they can be scaled back or canceled at
any time; (3) conspicuously state that Medicare entitlements can be
involuntarily bought back by the government in exchange for a
specified amount of money; (4) roll out new programs in one state at a
time; (5) turn Medicare benefits into a rebate rather than something
received at the point of purchase; (6) focus attention on the exchange
value of benefits by allowing people to sell unused benefits to the
government.
A. Quickly Cut Programs That Do Not Meet Expectations
The government should act swiftly to scale back or eliminate
programs that are not meeting expectations. This solution is based on
the sixth pertinent finding, namely that a person's willingness to
47. Jochen Reb & Terry Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership and the
Endownment Effect, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 107, 110 (testing ninety-
business undergraduates in Singapore).
48. Id. at 111.
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accept compensation increases the longer he or she owns something.
While the experiments behind that finding involved possession of a
physical object, multiple scholars have concluded that the difficulty of
eliminating legal entitlements increases with time. One author created
an elaborate equation demonstrating that a precedent creating
plaintiffs' rights is "most vulnerable to attack soon after it is made." 49
Another author reached a similar conclusion, stating: "Regulating new
entitlements is likely to generate less opposition."50 Therefore, the
government can preserve its freedom to adjust expenditures by acting
swiftly. One way to facilitate swiftness would be to set acceptable
performance standards for each new program before it is implemented
and then automatically cut a program if it falls below those standards
without extenuating circumstances.
B. Endless Pilot Program
The government should persistently call new Medicare programs
"pilot programs" and stress that they offer special additional benefits
that can be scaled back or canceled at any time. This would harness
the third pertinent finding because pilot programs seem more like
bonuses than baselines. Software developers have already begun using
this tactic with what Jim Morrison, a former dean of the Carnegie
Mellon School of Computer Science, calls the "endless beta."5 1 "Beta"
is the phase in the software development cycle where the software has
been released to the public with the warning that it still needs
significant tinkering. Based in part on the observation that Google
had begun leaving its software in beta for years, Morrison predicted
that the new trend would be for companies to keep software in beta
forever so that they can more easily and frequently alter it.52 It would
be a great boon for healthcare programs if they could evolve as
flexibly as computer programs.
49. Scharff & Partisi, supra note 12, at 33.
50. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1267.
51. See Jim Morris, The Endless Beta, JIM MORRIS'S THOUGHT OF THE WEEK
(OR MONTH, OR YEAR, ... ), (Friday, June 2, 2006) http://jimmorris.blogspot.com
/2006/06/endless-beta.html (using the phrase "endless beta" to describe software
releases that never progress past the beta phase).
52. See id.
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A more extreme version of an endless pilot program is to insert a
sunset clause in the laws establishing entitlements. A sunset clause is
text in a law that sets a termination date after which the law
automatically becomes ineffective.5 3  The government would then
have the option to reenact the law after each sunset if the program
worked as desired. One article asserts that sunset clauses can undo
any endowment effect by shifting the status quo.54 While sunset
clauses would undoubtedly mitigate the endowment effect because,
inter alia, the entitlement will not feel protected, they may not be a
practical solution because they would require duplication of the
immense effort needed to reach a legislative consensus.
C Buyback Provision
The government should inform Medicare beneficiaries that the
government has the power to buy back their "bonus" benefits
involuntarily for a specified amount of money. This solution utilizes
the findings that the endowment effect is weaker for things: (1)
protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule; (2) with certain
value; or (3) framed as a bonus rather than a baseline. These are the
first, fifth, and third pertinent findings respectively.
While Medicare benefits are not physical property, courts treat
them like property in that they will issue injunctions to prevent
deprivation of Medicare benefits without due process. For example,
in Grijalva v. Shalala,56 the Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction
ordering the government to provide Medicare benefits. The court held
that the way benefits were denied was a denial of due process because
of the importance of the patient's interest in the benefits.57 However,
53. LEGISLATIVE SERVICES OFFICE, LEGISLATION DRAFTING MANUAL:
CONCISE VERSION 15 (2013), available at http://legislature.idaho.gov/about/
draftingmanual.pdf.
54. Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605 (2002). The authors suggest that
legislators were able to let go of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
521 because of a sunset clause in sec. 601(a), § 598. Id.
55. See id.
56. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir., 1998) (cert. granted, judgment
vacated on other grounds).
57. Id. at 1121.
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due process is only necessary if there is a chance of erroneous
deprivation.58 A buyback provision removes any chance of erroneous
deprivation because no patient-specific inquiry is necessary. Unlike
the question of whether a specific procedure was covered for a
specific person, the question of whether a benefit was bought back can
be answered merely by determining whether the government exercised
the buyback provision. This means that courts are unlikely to use
injunctions to prevent entitlements from being bought back.
Specifying a buyback amount serves two purposes. First, it
increases certainty about the value of the benefits, which takes
advantage of the second pertinent finding, namely that the endowment
effect decreases with certainty of value. In an experiment described
above, the endowment effect attached more strongly to tokens with a
value that would not be determined until after the choice to sell or not
was made.59 The value of health care services is particularly uncertain
because of the unpredictability of human frailty and technological
innovation. Entitlements under the current Medicare system are like
tokens with an uncertain value because not only do people not know if
they will ever use that treatment, but they do not know how high the
cost of that treatment might rise during their lifetime. A specified
value in the buyback provision would act as a ceiling, decreasing
uncertainty and with it, the endowment effect.
The second purpose of a specified buyback amount is to allow the
government to protect itself against rising costs by declining to adjust
the amount for inflation. Because adjustments for inflation are
perceived as bonuses, 60 this tactic takes advantage of the third
pertinent finding, namely that the endowment effect attaches less
powerfully to benefits perceived as bonuses.
If the government declines to raise the buyback amount along
with inflation, the government could buy back the promised benefits
for a relatively low cost when expenditures grow too large to sustain.
58. See id. at 1122 (relying on the risk of erroneous deprivation). See also
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that the risk of erroneous
deprivation is a key factor for determining what process must be given before the
government ceases providing a benefit).
59. van Dijk & van Knippenberg, supra note 34, at 519.
60. See Kahneman et al., supra note 6, at 204 (explaining the greater perceived
fairness of reducing real wages by failing to adjust for inflation as a manifestation of
the perceived distinction between reducing a gain and imposing a loss).
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To get a sense of how much this tactic could save the government,
consider the fact that a surgery with a buyback provision set at
$10,000 in 1980 would have cost $15,862 by 1990 if adjustments had
been made each year for inflation.6 1 The buyback could be set to
automatically trigger when expenditures exceed initial estimates by a
certain percentage, thus sparing any individual politician from having
to take the blame for a reduction in benefits.
A recent tactic for reducing Social Security benefits illustrates the
viability of reducing the real value of a benefit by failing to adjust it
for inflation. Charged with finding a way to deal with ballooning
Social Security obligations, the Bipartisan Policy Center's Deficit
Reduction Task Force recommended that cost-of-living adjustments to
Social Security benefits should be tied to a different index called the
Chained Consumer Price Index ("Chained CPI"). 62 Despite the fact
that the Chained CPI will lead to fewer benefits than the currently
used index, opposition to this change has been mild. For example, the
Washington Post praised the Chained CPI as a more accurate
adjustment mechanism and a lesson that when balancing the budget,
"not every step must be painful."63 Balancing in such a manner
avoids pain because the reduction is perceived as the loss of a bonus
rather than the loss of a baseline. This tactic will only work for
Medicare if its benefits are tied to a fixed dollar amount as are Social
Security benefits, which is another reason to use the buyback
provision.
One potential negative effect of the buyback provision is that
beneficiaries may be less certain that they will receive healthcare.
People might react to this uncertainty in multiple ways. One potential
reaction is to save more. This could be beneficial even if the savings
are not needed to purchase healthcare because Americans generally do
not save enough for retirement. 64 Alternatively, beneficiaries might
61. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
62. Editorial, The Chained CPI, An Easy Way to Make Money, WASH. POST
(May 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-chained-cpi-an-easy-
way-to-save-money/2011/05/23/AGaYsLCHstory.html.
63. Id.
64. Kathleen Santoro, Social Security Privatization Santoro, 10 HOLY CROSS
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 58 (2006) (warning that without costly financial education,
Americans are unlikely to save enough for retirement).
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also respond to this uncertainty by purchasing insurance even though
they have Medicare. This side effect would be problematic because it
would require determination of whether the government or private
insurance should pay for each treatment and would cause redundant
administrative costs. A similar problem has been cited as the
justification for putting all liability for nuclear accidents on one entity
so that everyone else involved need not buy insurance. 65 However,
the fear generated by this uncertainty can be alleviated by categorizing
benefits into baseline benefits and bonus benefits. If only bonus
benefits can be bought back and baseline benefits include all of the
crucial treatments, beneficiaries will not be worried enough to buy
their own insurance.
In this system, bonus benefits can be exchanged while baseline
benefits are inalienable. Inalienability in this context prevents
exploitation of desperate or imprudent beneficiaries in the same way
as laws against organ sales.66 This dichotomy preserves the basic
safety net function of Medicare while taking advantage of the third
pertinent finding, namely that the endowment effect is less strong for
bonuses. The criteria for categorizing a treatment as a bonus could be
either low cost-effectiveness or high risk that costs will rise above
budget. Cost-effectiveness could be determined by the average
quality-adjusted-life-years ("QUALY") saved per dollar. QUALY is a
measure of health based on a person's valuation of different states of
health.6 7 Thus, a pill that prolongs life by one year of perfect health
(meaning no suffering and full capabilities) would be worth one
QUALY, whereas a pill that prolongs life for one year in a vegetative
state would be worth a small fraction of a QUALY.
A response to objections that involuntary buyback is too extreme
is that the mere existence of the buyback provision will significantly
reduce the endowment effect even if the government never exercises
65. John M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous
Activity, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 197, 221 (1972) (stating that strict liability was
imposed on nuclear operators to avoid cross claims and redundant insurance costs).
66. See, e.g., 1984 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
507, 98 STAT. 2339.
67. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 83-84 (1995) (describing quality-adjusted-life-years and
their ability to rank medical treatments against each other with a single, standardized
metric).
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its right. The existence of the buyback provision will both undermine
the feeling that the entitlement is well protected and make the value of
the entitlement more certain. Citizens who experience less of an
endowment effect because of the buyback provision will be more
inclined to voluntarily vote to reduce benefits when the money is
needed elsewhere. The government would only need to trigger
involuntary buybacks if it wanted to take advantage of a second
potential benefit of buybacks: the weakness of the endowment effect
for adjustments for inflation.
D. Roll Out New Programs in One State at a Time
Providing the benefit of a new Medicare program in staggered
stages, perhaps by one new state per week, may also lessen the
endowment effect. For example, if contact lenses were added to the
list of covered treatments, the actual contribution towards contact
lenses would only be made available in one state the first week and
two states the second week. This takes advantage of the seventh
pertinent finding, namely that the endowment effect is increased less
by knowledge of legal ownership than by possession. If only those
people who have experienced the benefit are biased and the rest of the
population can objectively assess whether the benefit is proving worth
the cost, then the unbiased portion of the population may be able to
exercise their political power in time to ask their legislators to repeal
the law.
The effectiveness of this solution may already have been tested
inadvertently by President Obama, whose Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act ("PPACA")68 has faced intense political
opposition. 69 The fact that there is a widespread call for repeal of the
PPACA but nary a peep about dismantling Medicare might be
attributable to the fact that many of the new benefits in the PPACA,
such as subsidies to purchase insurance, will not actually be provided
68. H.R. REP. No. 3590 (2010).
69. Dalia Sussman, Helene Cooper, & Kate Phillips, Most Oppose at Least
Part of Overhaul, Poll Finds, N. Y. TIMES March 26, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/most-americans-want-health-care-law-
overturned-or-changed-poll-finds.html (discussing a poll showing that two-thirds of
Americans are in favor of the overturning some or all of the PPACA and describing
a protest outside of the Supreme Court building).
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until 2014.70 Of course, this is only anecdotal evidence and there are
many political reasons for the opposition, so confirmation requires
rigorous scientific study of whether a one-state-at-a-time rollout can
effectively reduce the endowment effect.
E. Rebate Rather Than Point-of-Purchase Benefit
What follows is the most problematic of the proposed methods.
The advantages of the rebate method might be outweighed by its
complexity and its introduction of liquidity concerns. However, the
solution is worth discussing because of its ability to reduce the
evolutionary salience of benefits.
Medicare could be transformed into a rebate program, meaning
that instead of receiving the government's contribution to their care at
the point of purchase, beneficiaries would pay the full amount up front
and then receive reimbursement later. For reasons discussed below,
the rebate should come in the form of a lump payment every three
weeks that aggregates the contributions owed for all services used
during that time period. This solution is premised on the fourth
finding, that the endowment effect increases with the evolutionary
salience of an item, and the third finding, that the endowment effect
decreases when a loss is framed as the loss of a bonus.
Like food, which was used as an example of an item with high
evolutionary salience in the chimpanzee experiment described above,
health care is perceived as particularly important to survival. The
connection between healthcare and survival is strong, but that
connection could be weakened by framing benefits as money rather
than health care. To see how a rebate would achieve this, let us
compare the likely perception of a rebate to the perception of
Medicare benefits under the current system. When a recipient under
the current system goes to pick up pills that prevent heart attack,
Medicare pays for a portion of those pills while the recipient is
holding them at the register. It is only natural for a recipient in this
situation to perceive the benefit as lifesaving medication. On the other
70. David Pratt, Health Care Reform: Will It Succeed?, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 493, 496 (2011) (warning that Republicans may repeal the PPACA before
2014, when many of the most important provisions become effective); see also
Health Reform Implementation Timeline, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION (June 15, 2010) http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8060.pdf.
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hand, the recipient of a rebate would go buy pills without any
contribution from Medicare and then three weeks later receive one
check or direct deposit that lumps together the government's
contribution towards his heart pills along with contributions for
unrelated pills and doctor's visits. The passage of time in this
alternative attenuates the psychological link between the payment and
the health care. Similarly, the lumping together of payments focuses
the recipient's attention on the total monetary value rather than the
medical purpose of each government contribution. The rebate
recipient is likely to view his Medicare benefits as regular cash
payments, which are less evolutionarily salient than lifesaving
treatment.
A rebate system would also take advantage of the third pertinent
finding, namely that people are more accepting of reductions of
bonuses than raises of baseline costs. Cash payments are more likely
to seem like bonuses, whereas the amount paid at the point of
purchase is more likely to seem like the baseline. However, this is not
a strong reason to switch from the current Medicare system because
the current system is easy to view as a discount, the reduction of
which would probably be perceived as a reduction of a bonus as was
the car discount in the experiment described above.
A formidable objection to the rebate solution is that some people
might not be able to afford the initial purchase.7 1 This could not be
properly addressed by requiring healthcare providers to allow delayed
payment for two reasons. First, such a requirement would cause the
payment and the rebate to occur so close together that beneficiaries
would perceive the rebate as the provision of healthcare benefits. A
second failing of delayed payment is that beneficiaries might
accumulate more debt than they anticipate because of hyperbolic
discounting. Hyperbolic discounting is a cognitive bias that causes
people to mistakenly think that if they acquire something on credit
now they will not mind repaying it at the due date rather than a later
date.72 Yet, when the due date arrives, they do mind and this often
71. The median annual income of a Medicare beneficiary was only $21,183 in
2010. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Projecting Income and
Assets: What might the future hold for the next generation of Medicare
beneficiaries? (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8172.pdf.
72. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1396 (2004)
(explaining that consumers buy more on credit than they anticipate because they are
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causes them to delay paying even though such inaction increases their
debt. This problem could occur if medical services do not have to be
paid for at the time they are used.
A more promising, but administratively complex, way to
overcome liquidity constraints is to give every Medicare beneficiary a
sufficient amount of money as soon as they become eligible.
However, because of the temptation to spend this money, this method
might work best if the sum was deposited into a health savings
account. A health savings account is a bank account under an
individual's control that is funded by pre-tax contributions and
intended for use only on qualified medical expenses.7 3 To ensure that
people retain enough money to pay for healthcare in between rebate
payments, the account could be refilled out of an additional charge
automatically added to Medicare premiums whenever the account
balance falls too low. If a person is unable to afford these premiums,
then they will likely be covered by Medicaid, which, unlike Medicare,
bases eligibility on income. 74
An auxiliary benefit of supplying everyone with a health savings
account is that each Medicare beneficiary will have an account into
which a rebate can be directly deposited. A direct deposit will have
less evolutionary salience because its connection to healthcare will be
obscured by the fact that its arrival is less noticeable than the arrival of
a check.
Even with the complex system described above, there may be
times when a patient who would have been able to afford his co-
payment is not able to pay and then wait for a rebate. Therefore, the
rebate program should be limited to treatments that cost less than the
starting balance of the health savings account, at least until there is a
better solution to the liquidity problem.
hyperbolic discounters, defined as people whose short-term discount rate is larger
than their long-term discount rate).
73. See Robin Fisk, Patient Financial Responsibility under High Deductible
Health Plans: What Providers Can & Can't Do If the Patient Can't Pay, 18 HEALTH
LAW 16, 16 (2006) (defining health savings accounts and discussing possible
configurations).
74. Eligibility, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Eligibility/Eligibility.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
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For a concrete illustration of how the rebate would work, imagine
that a person becomes eligible for Medicare and receives a health
savings account with $8,000. He does not frequently check the
balance of this account because Medicare reimbursements keep it
relatively stable. At some point, he needs a hip replacement. The hip
replacement costs $6,000. He pays for it himself by writing a check
from his health savings account. His co-pay is 10%, meaning
Medicare will reimburse his account for $5,400. During that same
three-week period, imagine he also pays $40 dollars for one
medication and $10 for another medication. For those two
medications, his account is owed reimbursement of $45 after the 10%
co-pay. Two months later, he checks his balance and sees that it is
$7,395. Since so much time has passed since he received healthcare,
it is unlikely he will perceive that he is receiving particular prostheses
or medications from the government. After multiple years, his
balance falls below $6,000 after reimbursement. This triggers a
temporary increase in the premiums he must pay for Medicare. Those
increased premiums restore his balance to $8,000 and when he needs a
second hip replacement, he is able to pay for it himself and then wait
for reimbursement.
In conclusion, a rebate system could avoid liquidity problems
while significantly reducing the endowment effect if it used lump
direct-deposits into health savings accounts that are stabilized by
variations in Medicare premiums.
F. Focus Attention on the Exchange Value ofHealthcare Benefits
According to the fifth pertinent finding, people experience less of
an endowment effect when they assess an entitlement for its exchange
value rather than its use value.7 ' Therefore, the government can
decrease the endowment effect attached to Medicare benefits if it
allows beneficiaries to exchange their benefits for something else of
value. There are multiple ways to allow exchanges, but my preferred
solution is outlined below.
The first element of an exchange system that must be determined
is whether or not all benefits may be exchanged. It would be better to
distinguish between baseline benefits, which are inalienable, and
75. See Scharff & Partisi, supra note 12, at 29.
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bonus benefits, which can be sold. This will preserve the safety-net
function of Medicare while also taking advantage of the third pertinent
finding, namely that the endowment effect attaches less strongly to
bonuses. The details of the baseline-bonus dichotomy are more fully
explored above in Section III.C.
The second element of an exchange system that must be
determined is who should be permitted to buy the benefits. The
system would probably work best if the government were the only
permitted buyer. One reason to prevent private participants from
buying Medicare benefits is that they might exploit over-optimism or
desperation in order to grab benefits at unfair prices. Over-optimism is
a significant risk in the health insurance field. One study found that
more than half of subjects perceived their risk as average or lower
than average for heart attacks, strokes, cancer, and motor vehicle
crash.76 Even individualized risk explanations designed to correct this
over-optimism were unable to shake the bias related to heart attack
and motor vehicle crash. 7 While private actors would offer as little as
under-perceived risk allows, the government would ideally set its offer
only as low as necessary to prevent inefficient treatments or avert a
budget crisis.
The exchange system would be more effective if the exchange
value is standardized for each treatment. While negotiating the price
for each sale might focus attention even more on the exchange value,
the transaction costs and the risk of exploitation would likely
outweigh that advantage. One might think allowing negotiation of the
price of each transaction could reduce the endowment effect by
allowing beneficiaries to hire agents to negotiate for them, but
experiments have not conclusively established that use of an agent
reduces the endowment effect. While one experiment found no
endowment effect for agents merely asked to give advice,78 a different
experiment found an endowment effect for agents who were required
to negotiate on behalf of their client and were told that their
76. Matthew Kreuter & Victor Strecher, Changing Inaccurate Perceptions of
Health Risk: Results From a Randomized Trial, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 56, 59 (1995)
(studying 1317 adults).
77. Id. at 56.
78. James D. Marshall et al., Agents' Evaluations and the Disparity in
Measures ofEconomic Loss, 7 J. EcON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 115, 118-24 (1986).
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performance would affect their future business relationship with their
client.79
An example might clarify how this exchange system would
operate. Suppose that the government is considering extending
Medicare benefits to cover an experimental new stem cell treatment.
The government is worried about the uncertain cost and effectiveness,
so it classifies the new treatment as a bonus benefit and sets its
exchange value at $100,000. Five years later, studies show that the
new treatment costs more than expected, e.g. $500,000, while it has
only been able to extend life by an average of one month. Under this
system, the Medicare budget would be saved because the majority of
patients, used to thinking about this new treatment as a bonus and as
an exchangeable good, would not feel a strong endowment effect and
would prefer to exchange an inefficient treatment for $100,000 to
support their families.
One potential failing of this exchange system is that it might raise
government expenditures overall by obligating the government to pay
people who would never have used the treatment to which they were
entitled. One way to mitigate such an effect is to only allow a benefit
to be sold if a doctor recommends its use for that person at that time.
Even with that limitation, the discomfort of some procedures might
have been enough to dissuade a person from demanding the treatment
even without compensation. However, only a subset of treatments
cause intense discomfort, and even within that subset, refusal is rare.
For example, the months of nausea and fatigue caused by
chemotherapy only dissuade 10-15% of patients from undergoing
chemotherapy.8 0  If this rate of refusal applied to the stem cell
example above, then the government would still save an average of
$347,500 per person, even though it pays some people who would
never have used their benefit. Even when moderate discomfort should
overshadow a miniscule chance of success, over-optimism would
likely cause many patients to request treatments with extremely low
probabilities of success.
79. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1240.
80. Chemotherapy-Induced Nausea and Vomiting in Outpatients, JOURNAL
WATCH GENERAL MEDICINE (Sept. 5, 1989) available at http://general-
medicine.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/1989/905/5.
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IV. OBJECTIONS
It might be too difficult to apply these solutions to current benefits
because the endowment effect has latched on to them. That, however,
is not an insurmountable limitation because solutions still might be
incorporated into new benefits at the time of their creation. One
author suggested that this tactic is what allows state governments to
tax lottery tickets with much less opposition than they face for taxes
on other goods.8 ' For example, consumers would more strongly
oppose a tax on lattes than a tax on a lottery tickets if lotteries had
previously been illegal because only the latte tax would be perceived
as a loss.82
One potential general objection to all of my proposed methods for
weakening the endowment effect is that there is not enough
justification for intervention if the endowment effect is rational or at
least voluntarily experienced. However, scholars have questioned
both of those assumptions. First, some scholars have justified efforts
to bring WTA down to WTP by characterizing the endowment effect
as a symptom of bounded rationality.8 3 Bounded rationality occurs
when the limitations of the human mind preclude it from making
optimal decisions. 84 Second, the endowment effect is not voluntarily
experienced because even people who know about the endowment
effect underestimate how strongly it will affect them.85 This failure to
predict the strength of the endowment effect allows people to fall into
situations that their past selves would have wanted to prevent. For
example, a common technique for taking advantage of consumers is to
induce them to buy a product by presenting them with the misleading
81. Lawrence Zelenak, The Puzzling Case of the Revenue-Maximizing Lottery,
79 N.C. L. REv. 1, 28-30 (2000).
82. Id. at 30.
83. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 222 (arguing that the endowment
effect should be weakened because it results from distortions of judgment such as
failing to properly assess the opportunity costs of clinging to what one already has).
84. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957).
85. See Leaf Van Boven, George Loewenstein, & David Dunning,
Mispredicting the Endowment Effect: Underestimation of Owners' Selling Prices by
Buyer's Agents, 51 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 351, 352 (2003) ("If people were aware
of the endowment effect ... they could at least take these shifting preferences into
account when making decisions . . . Prior research, however, indicates that people
underestimate the magnitude of the endowment effect.").
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option to change their minds later.86  This option is misleading
because while consumers technically still have this option after
purchase, they will not exercise it because after purchase their
valuation will be inflated by the endowment effect. Protestations that
intervention violates autonomy are undermined when the object of
intervention would have chosen differently at a previous time. In fact,
one of the fundamental reasons that people support non-means-tested
government entitlement programs may be that it allows them to
achieve their long-term preference to save despite intervening short-
term preferences to spend.
V. CONCLUSION
The solutions discussed in this article have the potential to
considerably reduce the endowment effect attached to Medicare
benefits, allowing the United States to more efficiently allocate
resources and to experiment with new benefits without moving up a
one-way-ratchet. Even if these specific solutions do not prove
feasible, they serve as proof that experiments exploring the contours
of a cognitive bias, as opposed to experiments simply confirming its
existence, can be crucial for designing nuanced improvements of
government entitlement programs.
Many of the findings used above could also be used to lessen the
endowment effect attached to other entitlements granted by the
government. Here is just one roughly outlined example to spur future
research: the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") could insist that
every applicant confidentially submit the price at which they would be
willing to sell the patent8 8 if it is granted. Then the PTO could solicit
bids from anyone who believes that they can profitably develop the
86. Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Open Doors, Trap Doors, and the Law,
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 79 (2011).
87. John A. Robertson, "Paying the Alligator": Precommitment in Law,
Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2003) (describing Social
Security as a pre-commitment strategy that allows people to overcome
inconsistencies in valuing).
88. Experiments have detected a strong endowment effect for intellectual
property. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 25 (2011) (finding
that owners demanded much more for the right to profit from their poems than
buyers were willing to pay).
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patent. If the highest bidder bids higher than the reserve price, then
the bidder would have the right to force a sale at the moment that the
patent is approved. This proposal incorporates the findings that the
endowment effect is lessened by liability rules and by focus on
exchange value, the first and fifth pertinent findings respectively.
In order to ensure that applicants do not simply submit an
unrealistically high reserve price, the PTO could add to the application
fee a percentage of the reserve price. One scholar argued that a
somewhat similar mechanism would work to force homeowners to
accurately assess the value of their homes for tax purposes. 89  it
remains to be seen whether the application fee could be calibrated to
be high enough to discourage overvaluation but low enough for
inventors to afford. This is just one example of the many areas where
endowment effect experiments reveal potential improvements to
government programs.
While the endowment effect is a powerful and pervasive part of
human life, there are many ways for the well-informed lawmaker to
work around it. As this article has demonstrated, legislators can use
specific findings from endowment effect experiments to delay or
lessen the attachment of the endowment effect to Medicare benefits.
That would give legislators the flexibility to continually reallocate
money from inefficient programs and to safely experiment with new
Medicare programs without fearing that even failed experiments will
become permanent.
89. Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law,
68 VA. L. REv. 771, 779 (1982) (proposing that self-tax-assessments could be made
accurate by publishing them and allowing anyone to force a sale at that price).
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